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Byars v. State, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 85 (Oct. 16, 2014)1 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: WARRANTLESS BLOOD DRAWS 
 
Summary 
 
The Court determined that (1) pursuant to Missouri v. McNeely2, the natural dissipation 
of marijuana in the blood stream does not constitute a per se exigent circumstance permitting a 
warrantless blood draw, (2) NRS 484C.160(7)3, which allows officers to use force to obtain 
blood samples, violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution4, and (3) when 
a warrantless blood draw is nonetheless taken in good faith, evidence obtained from the blood 
draw is admissible at trial. 
 
Background 
 
 In 2012, Nevada Highway Patrol Trooper William Murwin pulled over Michael Byars for 
speeding. Murwin smelled marijuana and performed sobriety tests on Byars before arresting him 
on the belief that he was under the influence of a controlled substance. Murwin informed Byars 
that he would perform a blood test pursuant to Nevada’s implied consent law, NRS 
484C.160(1)5, but Byars refused. At the hospital, Byars struggled to avoid the blood draw, 
striking Murwin and another deputy. Officers used force to obtain Byars’ blood sample 
nonetheless, permitted by NRS 484C.160(7) 6. The results of the blood draw revealed THC in 
Byars’ bloodstream.7  
During an inventory search of Byars’ car, troopers found a handgun in a storage area of 
the car. The State also discovered evidence that Byars had a criminal history under the alias 
“Marcus Jones”. At trial, Byars admitted both to using the name Marcus Jones and to being 
convicted of prior felonies in Nevada. 
 The State charged Byars with five felony-level counts:  being an unlawful user of a 
controlled substance in possession of a firearm under NRS 202.360(1)8; unlawful use or being 
under the influence of a controlled substance under NRS 453.411(3)(a)9; two counts of battery 
by a prisoner in lawful custody or confinement under NRS 200.481(2)(f)10; and being a felon in 
possession of a firearm under NRS 202.360(1)(a)11. The district court bifurcated Byars’ trial 
between the first four counts and the fifth count, and found Byars guilty on all five counts, 
merging count one with count five for sentencing purposes. 
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Discussion 
 
The warrantless blood draw violated the Fourth Amendment 
 
 Byars correctly argued that when the officers took a forced blood sample from him, they 
acted in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution12 and Article 1, 
Section 18 of the Nevada Constitution13 because the warrantless blood draw did not fall within 
either recognized exception to the warrant requirement – exigent circumstances and consent  
 
The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement does not apply 
 
 A warrantless search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when there are 
compelling law enforcement needs because of the exigencies of a situation.14 Courts have been 
split in applying the exigent circumstances exception, but its application has been recently 
clarified by the U.S. Supreme Court in Missouri v. McNeely15. There, the Court held that the 
natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream, though a relevant factor in a “totality of the 
circumstances” exigent circumstances analysis, was insufficient on its own to justify warrantless 
blood draws in drunk-driving cases.16  In such a situation, “officers can reasonably obtain a 
warrant . . . without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search.”17 Similarly, the natural 
dissipation of marijuana in the bloodstream does not constitute a per se exigent circumstance. 
Looking at the totality of the circumstances, the State failed here to establish exigent 
circumstances needed to justify the warrantless blood draw. 
 
The consent exception to the warrant requirement does not apply 
 
 Though the State argued that the warrantless blood draw was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment because Byars gave implied consent under NRS 484C.160(1)18, Byars correctly 
asserts that he did not give consent and that NRS 484C.160(7)19, which allows officers to force a 
blood draw, is unconstitutional. Nevada’s implied consent statute gives drivers no choice to 
withdraw “consent” or to choose a penalty rather than submit to a drug test.  Thus, 
NRS 484C.160(7)20 essentially allows officers to conduct a warrantless blood draw where no 
valid consent or other exception to the warrant exception to the Fourth Amendment21 exists, 
making the statute unconstitutional.  
 
The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies 
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 The State correctly argued that because Murwin relied on the presumptive 
constitutionality of Nevada’s laws in good faith, the evidence obtained from Byars’ blood sample 
need not be suppressed. The exclusionary rule exists solely to deter unconstitutional police 
conduct. Thus, where the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement applies, the 
exclusionary rule does not.  
 
The district court erred by convicting Byars of being an unlawful user in possession of a firearm 
after merging the count with the conviction for felon in possession of a firearm 
 
 Byars argued that a single instance of substance use does not justify a conviction of being 
an unlawful user or addict in possession of a firearm under NRS 202.360(1)(c)22, but the Court 
does not reach this issue. The State conceded on appeal that the district court erred in finding 
Byars guilty of being an unlawful user in possession of a firearm after merging this count with 
the count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. 
 
The State adequately proved the corpus delicti of the felon-in-possession charge 
 
 Regarding the count of felon in possession of a firearm, Byars argued that the State failed 
to prove the corpus delicti of the crime. However, the State’s introduction of Byars’ convictions 
under the alias “Marcus Jones” was sufficient for a prima facie showing that Byars was a 
convicted felon, supporting a reasonable inference that the crime, felon in possession of a 
firearm, was committed. 
 
The convictions for misdemeanor DUI and felony being under the influence of a controlled 
substance do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause 
 
Byars incorrectly argues that his convictions for misdemeanor DUI and felony being 
under the influence of a controlled substance violate the Double Jeopardy Clause and are 
redundant. 
  
Double Jeopardy 
 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution23 
prohibits multiple prosecutions and punishments of an individual for one crime. This did not 
occur here, because a violation for having an illegal quantity of a controlled substance in the 
bloodstream is separate from a violation for driving while under the influence of that substance. 
The State merely proved the threshold amount of marijuana in the blood as a separate element 
than the “under the influence” element of NRS 453.41124.  
 
Redundancy 
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  Byars argues that a defendant is not subject to multiple convictions for the same conduct. 
However, as the Court has repeatedly disapproved of this “same conduct” theory, Byars’ 
argument has no merit.25 
 
Sufficient evidence supports the convictions for battery 
 
 Byars argues that his two convictions for battery should be reversed because the State 
provided insufficient evidence that he intended to strike the officers during the forced blood 
draw. The Court rejects Byars’ argument, concluding that the State’s evidence was sufficient for 
a rational trier of fact to find that Byars engaged in the “willful” use of force against the two 
officers.26  
 
Byars was in custody when he committed the batteries 
 
 Though he argues otherwise, Byars was validly convicted under NRS 200.48127 because 
the batteries occurred while he was in custody. The Court has held that a person is “in custody” 
when under lawful arrest28, as Byars was here.  
 
The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever the first four counts 
 
 District courts have the discretion to join or sever charges.29  Here, the district court 
bifurcated Byars’ trial between the first four counts and the fifth count to prevent prejudice to 
Byars. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever the first four counts, 
however, because they all related to the same transaction – Byars’ marijuana use and the related 
events regarding the blood draw.  
 
Remarks made during the State’s closing arguments were not prejudicial  
  
 Finally, Byars argues that the State’s remarks in closing arguments were unfairly 
prejudicial. However, none of the specific statements which Byars claims were prejudicial 
included assertions of fact that were not already contained in the record. Considering the content 
of the statements at closing argument and the high threshold for overturning a jury verdict, the 
Court finds that Byars was not denied a fair trial. 
 
Conclusion 
  
 Regarding the warrantless blood draw, the Court applied Missouri v. McNeely30, holding 
that the dissipation of marijuana in Byars’ blood stream did not fall within the exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. Further, the Court held that, despite 
Nevada’s implied consent statute, the Nevada statute allowing officers to use force to obtain the 
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blood draw violates the Fourth Amendment because it allows for warrantless searches in the 
absence of valid consent or another valid exception to the warrant requirement.  
Finding that Murwin nevertheless obtained the evidence against Byars in good faith, the 
Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply here. Thus, the Court determined that 
reversal of the judgment of conviction against Byars in full would be improper.   
However, the Court held that the district court erred by merging Count 1 (unlawful user 
of a controlled substance in possession of a firearm), with Count 5 (felon in possession of a 
firearm) and finding Byars guilty with regard to Count 1. The State conceded on appeal that the 
district court erred here. The Court reversed and remanded to the district court to correct the 
judgment of conviction in this respect, while affirming the decision in all other respects.  
